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I. INTRODUCTION 
Reaching a decision to award attorney fees without an exercise of reason or outside the 
boundaries of a district court’s discretion is an abuse of that discretion. The district court in this 
case properly understood that awarding fees to Chris Kirk dba Kirk Enterprises (“Kirk”) was 
within its discretion. The district court also properly understood that Kirk was entitled to an award 
of fees for defending against a frivolous claim. The problem, however, is that the district court’s 
actions, in awarding Kirk a small percentage of the total fees incurred in defending against the 
frivolous claim, are not logically supported by the explanation provided in the court’s written 
decision.  Therefore, because the court explained that the fees incurred by Kirk in defending 
against both the frivolous and non-frivolous claims were indivisible, the district court did not reach 
its apportionment decision through an exercise of reason or within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion.  
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The logical disconnect between the language and reasoning of the district court’s 
decision and the amount of fees actually awarded to Kirk indicates either a failure to 
reach the decision through an exercise of reason, a failure to act within the boundaries 
of the court’s discretion, or both.  
The district court’s apportionment decision was based, at least in part, on the court’s 
subjective belief that because Kirk’s counsel did not file an early dispositive motion on the non-
frivolous claim, regardless of the ramifications of losing that motion, that Kirk was not deserving 
of a fee award for the time spent defending against the frivolous claim. R. Vol. 1, p. 1156. Even 
though the court considered Petrus’ argument supporting the non-frivolous claim and his 
interpretation of the accrual rules and statute of limitations rules to be considerably weaker than 
Kirk’s argument, the court explained that Petrus framed the issue as one of first impression.  R. 
Vol. 1, p. 1154-1155. So, because Kirk did not seek an early dismissal of a non-frivolous claim, 
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that the district court believed presented an issue of first impression, the court penalized Kirk by 
severely limiting the fee award he received for the fees incurred defending against the frivolous 
claim. The logical disconnect between the district court’s actual fee award and the reasons 
expressed in the language of its supporting opinion equates to an abuse of discretion through a 
failure to exercise reason and failure to act within the boundaries of the court’s discretion.  
In its fee apportionment to Kirk, the district court explained that fee-shifting under I.C. 
§12-121 was appropriate with respect to the non-frivolous conspiracy-to-defraud claim. R. Vol. 1, 
p. 1154. Typically, in any determination of an award of costs and fees, the threshold question is 
which party prevailed. The district court properly answered that question, Petrus did not appeal 
the question, and it is not contested at this point. Thus, no further analysis of that threshold question 
is required. Kirk was the prevailing party and was entitled to an award of fees under I.C. §12-121 
for defending against the frivolous conspiracy claim.  
The district court properly understood that Kirk was entitled to a fee award for defending 
against the frivolous claim. R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. The court expressed no confusion over whether 
fees had been incurred in defending against the frivolous claim. R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. In fact, the 
court clearly expressed its understanding that “almost all of the work that was necessary to defend 
against the conspiracy-to-defraud claim to also have been necessary to defend against the implied-
warranty claim.” R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. The court also went on to state that “most of the work pertained 
to both claims indivisibly or to the implied-warranty claim in particular” R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. This 
language is broad. The use of the phrases “almost all” and “both claims indivisibly” indicate that 
the court understood that the work was performed defending against both claims. Further, the 
language used by the district court does not indicate that it perceived the indivisible work to be 
limited to discovery issues as Petrus suggests. Petrus did not voluntarily drop the conspiracy claim 
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after discovery unveiled its frivolousness. The claim was successfully defended by Kirk through 
the filing of a summary judgment motion. Not until the actual summary judgment hearing, after 
failing to provide any argument supporting the claim in its briefing, was Petrus forced to stop 
pursuing the frivolous conspiracy claim.  
How, then, did the district court conclude that Kirk was only entitled to an award of seven 
percent of his total fees incurred? Even after the court had concluded that most of the time spent 
defending Kirk was spent defending both a frivolous claim and a non-frivolous claim, and further, 
that the defense of the frivolous claim took the litigation process through discovery and the 
summary judgment stage of this lawsuit. Respectfully, it is submitted that the district court did not 
reach its decision through an exercise of reason or within the outer boundaries of its discretion.  
The court did not state that it was unable to determine from the record which fees were 
attributable to the defense of the frivolous claim and which fees were attributable to the defense of 
the non-frivolous claim. If this had been the case, then denying Kirk’s fee request in whole, or 
making a small award, may have been proper. As this Court explained in Brooks v. Gigray 
Ranches, Inc., if a district court is unable to separate, and determine from the record, which claims 
the attorney fees were incurred defending, denying a fee request is proper. See, Brooks v. Gigray 
Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 78, 910 P.2d 744, 750 (1996). Our situation is different. The district 
court explained its approach as a careful review of the record, a determination that equal work was 
done defending both claims, and then somehow still determined that a seven percent award was 
proper.   
How have other courts defined an abuse of discretion? Courts from around the country 
have held that in general, a trial court abuses its discretion where its order is clearly against the 
logic of the circumstances, is arbitrary and unreasonable, and indicates a lack of careful 
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consideration; where the court has acted arbitrarily without the employment of its conscientious 
judgment; where there is an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude on the part of the 
court; or where the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Discretion also 
is abused where manifest injustice has been done, where the appellate court has a definite and firm 
conviction that the lower court erred, where there has been a deprivation of rights, or where the 
judgment is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 907. 
Using these general definitions as a guide, the district court’s decision to award Kirk seven percent 
of his total fees after explaining that most of the work pertained to both claims indivisibly, but that 
defense counsel should have filed a dispositive motion earlier in the case on the non-frivolous 
claim, equates to an abuse of discretion under a number of the above definitions. The district court 
either failed to reach its decision through an exercise of reason, or through action outside the 
bounds of the court’s discretion, or both. Either way, the issue of apportionment of fees should be 
remanded so the district court can reanalyze its decision.   
Had the district court fairly applied the logic expressed in its opinion, that the services 
provided by Kirk’s counsel in defending against the frivolous claim equaled the services spent 
defending against the non-frivolous claim, a reasonable attorney fee award to Kirk would have 
very likely been closer to fifty percent of the fees incurred, not seven.  This, coupled with the 
district court’s expression of displeasure with defense counsel’s strategic choice of foregoing the 
early filing of a motion to dismiss the non-frivolous claim, which the court perceived as an issue 
of first impression, and instead proceed through discovery and summary judgment, equates to the 
court improperly substituting its judgment for that of the litigants and counsel and imposing a 
penalty for not viewing the litigation through the same lens as the court.  
For these reasons, we respectfully request that this Court take the opportunity to remedy 
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the error by remanding and allowing the district court the opportunity to reassess its decision and 
reapportion the fee award to Kirk through a proper exercise of reason within the bounds of its 
discretion.  
B. Fees should be awarded to Kirk.  
Petrus has not made a reasoned argument as to why the law should evolve in the direction 
he suggests. Instead, he has filed an ill-reasoned appeal, for an ill purpose, based on a strained 
reading of Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987). The district court 
properly rejected Petrus’ attempt to convert a breach of implied warranty of habitability claim, 
sounding in contract, into a tort claim to avoid application of the appropriate contract statute of 
limitations. The argument is entirely self-serving for Petrus. Its acceptance does not advance Idaho 
warranty law or provide any compelling reason for a change in the law. As previously explained 
in the Respondent/Cross-Appellant’s Brief, the economic loss doctrine absolutely stands in the 
way of Petrus recovering from Kirk. As do other valid legal arguments that were presented below 
but not considered or written about in the summary judgment decision. Petrus knows this. He 
chooses to ignore this and argues that none of this applies. That argument fails. This appeal was 
brought and pursued for frivolous reasons, not in some effort to help Idaho develop the law.  
With regard to the cross-appeal, the district court’s expressed logic does not match its 
action. The failure to exercise reason and act within the bounds of its discretion is an abuse of 
discretion for which this Court should take action. That action should be a remand back to the 
district court.   
For these reasons, we respectfully ask the Court uphold the law expressed in Tusch, and 
not alter the course of Idaho law for years to come so that only Petrus can benefit. An implied 
warranty claim sounds in contract, not tort. We further ask the Court to remand the fee award back 
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to the district court for review and reapportionment. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons expressed in Respondent/Cross-Appellant’s 
Brief, the Court should affirm the decision awarding summary judgment to Kirk, find that the 
district court abused its discretion and remand the award of attorney fees back to the district court 
for review and reapportionment, declaring Kirk the prevailing party on appeal.  
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of November, 2017. 
     ARKOOSH LAW OFFICES 
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      Daniel A. Nevala 
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